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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950444-CA 
v. : 
LEWIS RICKY YATES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Lewis Ricky Yates appeals the sentence imposed for 
his conviction for theft, a class A misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 (1995) (R. 81). This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) (Supp. 
1995) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Where the State continued to contend the property 
defendant stole had a higher value than that to which defendant 
admitted to support his plea, should the Court allow defendant to 
rely on his property value admission to obtain a sentence even 
lower than that for which the parties bargained? 
2. Should the appellate courts limit the rule that a 
1 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of a pre-sentencing 
statutory amendment that lowers the applicable penalty to exclude 
situations where, as here, the defendant delays the sentencing 
until after the effective date of the amendment by his 
unjustified absences from prior sentencing hearings? 
Because both issues involve the interpretation of or a 
change in precedent, the present questions of law reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ANP RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with theft, a third degree 
felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 and 76-6-412 
(1995) (R. 5-6). Defendant agreed to plead guilty to class A 
misdemeanor theft and pleaded guilty to that crime on January 13, 
1995 (R. 5, 17, 25-26, 111-12). By order dated June 28, 1995, 
the trial court sentenced defendant to a one-year prison term, 
imposed a $1,000 fine, and ordered defendant to pay restitution 
(R. 81). Defendant filed his notice of appeal on July 11, 1995 
(R. 91) . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
When defendant broke-up with Raylynn Coumier and moved out, 
he took her property without permission (R. 6). The State 
contended the stolen property had a value of $1,234 (R. Ill), and 
Ms. Coumier's insurance company valued the stolen property at 
$1,150 (R. 137).x 
The State agreed to accept defendant's guilty plea to class 
A misdemeanor theft rather than try him for the charged third 
degree felony theft (R. 20). Defendant admitted that the 
property he stole had a value between $100 and $250, the amount 
then necessary to support a conviction a class A misdemeanor 
theft conviction (R. 18). Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1) (c) 
(1995) . 
After accepting the plea, the trial court ordered a 
presentence investigation report and scheduled sentencing for 
February 17, 1995 (R. 25-26). By letter filed February 13, 1995, 
the Department of Corrections informed the trial court that 
defendant missed his appointment for his presentence 
investigation interview (R. 32). Defendant subsequently failed 
to appear at the February sentencing hearing, and the trial court 
xThe insurance company paid Ms. Coumier $900, but did not 
pay the $250 deductible (R. 137). 
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issued a bench warrant (R. 33-34). 
After securing defendant's attendance on March 13, 1995, the 
trial court continued sentencing to April 14, 1995 in order to 
obtain a presentence report (R. 44). By letter filed April 11, 
1995, the Department of Corrections informed the trial court that 
defendant had again missed his presentence investigation 
interview (R. 46). In support of a motion to withdraw as 
counsel, defendant's retained counsel stated that defendant had 
not contacted him since bailing out of jail, and that counsel had 
made approximately forty telephone calls to defendant's friends, 
relatives, and bail bondsman in unsuccessful attempts to locate 
defendant (R. 47). Defendant also failed to appear at the April 
14, 1995 sentencing and the trial court issued another bench 
warrant for defendant's arrest (R. 48-49). 
On May 1, 1995, legislature's amendments to the theft 
statutes took effect. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 
1995). Those amendments changed the relevant theft 
classifications as follows: 1) third degree felony theft now 
requires a $1,000 to $5,000 property value; 2) class A 
misdemeanor theft now requires a $300 to $1,000 property value; 
and 3) any property value under $300 is a class B misdemeanor. 
4 
Defendant was arrested on May 22, 1995 on the April 1995 
bench warrant (R. 52). On June 2, 1995, the trial court 
scheduled sentencing for June 28, 1995 to allow time for a 
presentence report and denied defendant's motion for bail (R. 
55). The trial court imposed the punishment prescribed for a 
class A misdemeanor (R. 81).2 At sentencing, defendant asserted 
that Utah law required the trial court to sentence him to class B 
misdemeanor theft under the amended classifications (R. 132-34). 
The trial court refused, noting that: 1) defendant voluntarily 
pleaded to a class A misdemeanor; and 2) defendant's repeated 
failures to appear caused the delay in sentencing beyond the 
effective date of the theft classification amendments (R. 140-
41) . 
The argument sections contain further relevant facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant is not entitled to be resentenced to a class 
B misdemeanor. Defendant grounds his argument on his admission 
during his change of plea that he stole property with a value of 
between $100 and $250: the amount necessary at the time he 
2The trial court also imposed restitution of the $250 
deductible on Ms. Coumier's insurance (R. 141). The trial court 
refused to order restitution to the insurance company for the 
$900 it paid on Ms. Coumier's claim (id.). 
5 
pleaded to support his guilty plea to class A misdemeanor theft. 
Defendant claims that, because the legislature amended the 
classifications after his plea, but prior to his sentencing to 
require proof of a property value between $300 and $1,000 to 
support a class A misdemeanor sentence for theft, the trial court 
should have sentenced him to a class B misdemeanor. However, the 
State bargained for defendant's plea to a crime punishable as a 
class A misdemeanor, and defendant only admitted to the facts 
necessary to consummate that bargain. Resentencing defendant to 
a class B misdemeanor would deprive the State of the benefit of 
its bargain. 
Moreover, defendant relies on cases that require trial 
courts to sentence defendants under the law in effect at the time 
of sentencing if the legislature has reduced the penalty for the 
charged crime. However, those cases do not require the result 
defendant seeks in this case. In those cases, the undisputed or 
established facts permitted imposing only the amended, reduced 
penalty. In this case, the State contended throughout the plea 
and sentencing process that defendant stole property worth over 
$1,000. Because the parties neither established nor stipulated 
to a property value supporting only a class B misdemeanor theft 
sentence, the cases on which defendant relies do not require 
6 
resentencing him to a class B misdemeanor. 
2. If the Court finds that the cases on which defendant 
relies do control this case, then the State contends that the 
rule requiring trial courts to sentence a defendant to an 
amended, lower penalty should be limited to exclude defendants 
who have delayed their sentencings beyond the effective date of 
the amended statutes. Admittedly, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that the rule applies even when the defendant delays the 
sentencing by absenting himself from prior sentencings. However, 
the majority opinion in that case, failed to consider the 
potential the rule creates for manipulating the system. 
Moreover, in the last twenty years since deciding that case, the 
supreme court has not reconsidered whether to apply the rule in 
cases similar to this one. Sound policy requires limiting the 
rule to prevent defendants from obtaining more favorable 
sentences by flouting trial courts' orders to appear for 
sentencing. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT ORDER THE TRIAL COURT TO 
RESENTENCE DEFENDANT TO A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR BECAUSE 
IT WOULD GIVE DEFENDANT A BENEFIT BEYOND THAT FOR WHICH 
HE BARGAINED, AND BECAUSE IT IS NOT REQUIRED BY THE 
CASES ON WHICH DEFENDANT RELIES 
This Court should affirm defendant's sentence for a class A 
misdemeanor theft because it gives to each party that for which 
it bargained in the plea agreement. Defendant claims that this 
Court should order the trial court to sentence him to a class B 
misdemeanor because: 1) he admitted to a property value of 
between $100 and $250 when he pleaded guilty to class A 
misdemeanor theft; 2) the trial court did not sentence him until 
after the new theft classifications took effect; and 3) a class A 
misdemeanor under the amended classifications requires proof of a 
property value between $300 and $1,000, and any value under $300 
only supports a class B misdemeanor theft sentence. 
While the precedent on which defendant relies appears to 
support his argument, that precedent should not apply under the 
circumstances of this case. Defendant's argument unjustifiably 
promotes the importance of the facts to which defendant admitted 
over the benefit each party sought from the plea bargain. The 
State agreed to forego prosecuting defendant for third degree 
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felony theft in exchange for his guilty plea to class A 
misdemeanor theft (R. 20). The State bargained for and obtained 
defendant's admission to a crime punishable as a class A 
misdemeanor. To complete the bargain, defendant admitted to the 
facts necessary to support a guilty plea to class A misdemeanor 
theft, including an admission that he stole property valued in 
the range then necessary to support a class A misdemeanor 
sentence (R. 18, 116) . However, as discussed below, the parties 
never established or stipulated to the property's actual value; 
that actual value was incidental to the bargain they had struck. 
Because the existing one-year sentence gives to each party that 
for which it bargained, and because ordering a lower class B 
misdemeanor sentence would give defendant a windfall achieved 
only by his flouting the trial court's orders to appear, this 
Court should affirm defendant's sentence for a class A 
misdemeanor. Cf. State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1274-76 (Utah 
1988) (vacating a plea because the State's agreement had no real 
value for the defendant). 
Furthermore, the precedent on which defendant relies does 
not require the result he seeks under the facts of this case. 
Relying entirely on his admission that the property he stole had 
a value between $100 and $250, defendant seeks the benefit of the 
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principle that a trial court must sentence a defendant to the 
penalty in effect at the time of sentencing if the legislature 
has lowered the penalty for his crime prior to sentencing. 
Defendant contends that the facts to which he admitted supports 
at most a class B misdemeanor sentence, and that this Court 
should therefore order resentencing accordingly. While Utah 
precedent generally gives defendants the benefit of this rule, it 
should not control this case. 
In adopting the rule on which defendant relies, the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized the legislature's prerogative to 
establish the level of punishment for any given set of facts 
constituting a crime and consequently restricted the trial courts 
to imposing the penalty prescribed at the time the trial court 
sentenced a defendant. State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 335-36 (Utah 
1971); Belt v. Turner. 479 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1971). Applying 
the rule in the cases establishing it served the policy adopted 
by the court because the established or undisputed facts 
permitted imposing only the lower penalty established by the 
amended legislation.3 
3In State v. Saxton. 519 P.2d 1340, 1340-41 (Utah 1974) and 
State v. Tapp. 490 P.2d 334, 335 (Utah 1971), juries resolved any 
disputes in the facts supporting the elements of the charged 
crimes. In Belt v. Turner. 479 P.2d 791, 792 (Utah 1971), Belt 
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That is not the case here. The parties agreed that 
defendant would plead to a specific penalty classification, then 
defendant admitted to facts sufficient to support that 
classification. Specifically, defendant admitted that the 
property he stole had a value between $100 and $250 (R. 116), the 
range of values necessary to support his plea to class A 
misdemeanor theft at the time he made it, but $50 less than the 
amount necessary to support the same plea under the amended 
classifications. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(c) (1995) and 
(Supp. 1995). 
However, the parties did not stipulate to nor prove the 
actual value of the property stolen, and the trial court did not 
make any finding as to its actual value. To the contrary, the 
parties continued to dispute the property's actual value. At the 
change of plea hearing, the State pointed out that defendant had 
agreed to pay the full restitution, which the State contended 
amounted to $1,234 (R. 111). At the sentencing hearing, the 
State proffered that Ms. Coumier's insurance company had valued 
pleaded guilty to issuing a fraudulent $10 check without 
sufficient funds (a charge that depended upon the amount of the 
check to determine the punishment), and nothing in the opinion 
suggests any dispute existed as to the amount for which Belt 
wrote the check. 
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the property at $1,150 (R. 137). Either amount is sufficient to 
support the originally-charged third degree felony theft even 
under the amendments. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995). 
Defendant offered no alternative value; rather, he simply agreed 
that he stole the property, and that it had at least the value 
sufficient to support the theft classification to which he agreed 
to plea (R. 116). Indeed, that defendant admitted to the then 
applicable range, rather than a specific dollar amount, supports 
concluding that he did not necessarily dispute that the property 
had sufficient value to support a the originally-charged third 
degree felony, but merely admitted to no more than the amount 
necessary to support his guilty plea to a class A misdemeanor. 
Because the parties did not establish or stipulate to facts 
supporting only a class B misdemeanor, the cases on which 
defendant relies do not require resentencing him to a further 
penalty reduction. 
In short, the trial court should affirm the trial court's 
class A misdemeanor sentence because it gives to both parties the 
benefit of their plea bargain, and because the rule on which 
defendant relies does not require the outcome he seeks. 
Alternatively, if this Court determines it cannot affirm the 
sentence, the argument above still precludes resentencing him to 
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a class B misdemeanor. At most, the Court should vacate the plea 
and allow the parties either to establish the property's value or 
to renegotiate defendant's plea. The Court should not allow 
defendant to use his dilatoriness to obtain a windfall in the 
plea bargaining process. 
POINT 11 
ALTERNATIVELY, EXISTING UTAH CASE LAW SHOULD BE 
MODIFIED TO PRECLUDE A DEFENDANT FROM OBTAINING THE 
BENEFIT OF A LOWER SENTENCE WHERE HIS OWN CONDUCT 
DELAYS SENTENCING BEYOND THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE 
AMENDMENTS LOWERING THE PENALTY 
If the Court disagrees with the State's argument that the 
rule on which defendant relies does not apply to this case, then 
the State argues alternatively that the rule should be limited to 
exclude situations, such as this, where the delay in sentencing 
beyond the effective date of the reduced penalty results from 
defendant's failure to appear for prior sentencing hearings. The 
State recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court has given defendants 
the benefit of a lower penalty even where their own conduct 
delayed the sentencing beyond the effective date of the statutory 
amendments lowering the penalty. State v. Saxton. 519 P.2d 134 0 
(Utah 1974). That precedent binds this Court. State v. Menzies. 
889 P.2d 393, n.3 (Utah 1994), cert, denied. 115 S. Ct. 910 
(1995). Therefore, if this Court reaches this argument, the 
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State requests that it certify the question to the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to rule 43, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Whatever policy reasons support giving the benefit of the 
amended, lower penalty to a defendant who does nothing to delay 
the sentence, giving that same benefit to a defendant who does 
delay his sentencing promotes countervailing bad policy: it 
allows a defendant, such as this defendant, to manipulate the 
system and defy court orders to appear for sentencing, then 
receive a reduced sentence as a reward.4 The law should not 
create an opportunity for such manipulation. 
The majority opinions in Belt. Tapp. and Saxton do not 
discuss the potential for such manipulation. Moreover, the 
supreme court decided Saxton. the most recent opinion 
establishing the rule, over twenty years ago and has not since 
applied it in a situation, such as the one in this case, where 
4Defendant contends that the record contains no proof of why 
he did not appear for the sentencing hearings he missed, 
suggesting that he may have had a good reason for his absences. 
While the record contains no direct proof of why he failed to 
appear, it inferentially suggests that something more than bad 
luck caused his absences. Defendant failed to appear at the 
first preliminary hearing, two sentencing hearings, and two 
presentence interviews (R. 32-33, 46, 125-26, 135-37, 140-41) . 
He also failed to maintain contact with his retained attorney or 
his bail bondsman (R. 47). The record contains no evidence that 
he had a reasonable excuse for his chronic absences, and he 
offered none at the June 1994 sentencing. 
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the defendant sought the benefit of this rule after absenting 
himself until the more favorable penalty scheme took effect. Cf. 
State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568, 572-73 (Utah) (1991) (dictum) 
(rejecting the common law rule of resisting an unlawful arrest 
because the conditions justifying the rule no longer existed). 
To prevent manipulating the system to obtain a more favorable 
sentence, the State asks that the appellate courts now limit the 
rule to exclude situations where a defendant delays sentencing 
beyond the effective date of the amendments by failing to appear 
for prior sentencing hearings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the State asks the Court to 
affirm defendant's sentence. Alternatively, the State asks that 
the Court, at most, vacate defendant's plea rather than order the 
trial court to resentence him to a class B misdemeanor. 
15 
Qral Argument Requested 
Because the State has asked this Court to distinguish prior 
precedent, it requests oral argument to answer any questions or 
concerns the Court may have about the approach the State asks it 
to take. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z day of ^ 4 x » , 
m^ 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE QF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed by first-class mail, 
postage pre-paid, to the following on this 2™ day of 
11% : 
JOAN C. WATT 
REBECCA HYDE 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM A 
OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 76-6-404 
court properly refused to give an instruction 
proffered by defendant. State v. Larsen, 876 
P.2d 391 (Utah Ct App. 1994). 
Pleading and practice. 
Section 76-6-404 is the "general offense of 
theft" required to be pled by this section to 
invoke the provisions of consolidated theft 
Once the prosecution charges a defendant with 
the general offense of "theft" under § 76-6-404, 
it may then present its evidence to prove the 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-404, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-404. 
Cross-References. — Motor vehicles, spe-
ANALYSIS 
Bailments. 
Comment on defendant's silence. 
Corpus delicti. 
Elements of offense. 
Evidence. 
—Weight and sufficiency. 
Included offenses. 
—Possession. 
Instructions. 
Intent. 
Pleading and practice. 
Possession of recently stolen property. 
"Purpose to deprive." 
Separate offenses. 
Unauthorized control. 
Venue. 
Cited. 
Bailments. 
Bailor could be guilty of stealing his own 
property, if done with intent to charge bailee. 
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626 
(1943). 
Comment on defendant's silence. 
Where defendant charged with theft of build-
ing materials from construction site did not 
testify in his own defense and offered no evi-
dence to explain his late-night presence at the 
site, prosecutor's comment that: T h e defense 
has presented no evidence as to why defendant 
was out there. What was he doing out there?" 
was a legitimate comment on what the total 
evidence did or did not show; it was not imper-
missible comment on defendant's failure to tes-
tify. State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975). 
theft was committed in any manner specified in 
§§ 76-6-404 to 76-6-410. State v. Fowler, 745 
P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Receiving stolen property. 
Evidence that establishes receiving stolen 
property under § 76-6-408 is sufficient to sus-
tain a conviction of theft without the necessity 
of establishing theft by taking. State v. Taylor, 
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). 
rial anti-theft laws, § 41-la-1308 et seq. 
Shoplifting Act, § 78-11-14 et seq. 
Corpus delicti. 
In prosecution for larceny it was not essential 
that corpus delicti be established by evidence 
independent of that adduced to prove that de-
fendant was perpetrator of crime; the same 
evidence could be used to prove both. State v. 
Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 228 (1943), rev*d 
on other grounds, 105 Utah 162, 145 P.2d 494 
(1944). 
Corpus delicti for offense of theft consists of 
the elements that one entitled to possession of 
the property has been deprived of possession 
and such deprivation has been accomplished by 
a felonious taking; evidence of the property 
having been taken from the possession of the 
owner without his knowledge or consent is 
evidence of both of the elements of the corpus 
delicti. SUte v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 
1980). 
Elements of offense. 
State is not required to prove conclusively 
who the real owner of the property is, but only 
that defendant obtained or exercised unautho-
rized control over the property of another. State 
v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah 1977). 
This section requires a finding of only one of 
two disjunctives, "obtained" or "exercised unau-
thorized control" over the property of another 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof; convic-
tion for theft can be upheld without a finding 
that defendant "obtained" the property, so long 
as there is a finding that he "exercised unau-
thorized control" over it. State v. Walker, 649 
P.2d 16 (Utah 1982). 
Evidence. 
Proof of identity of stolen goods could be by 
either direct or circumstantial evidence. State 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
197 
76-6-411 CRIMINAL CODE 
demands by owner, court, sitting without a jury, viation" has the common sense meaning of 
was not required to believe defendant's testi- being an extreme deviation. State v. Owens, 
mony that he gave typewriter to his business 638 P. 2d 1182 (Utah 1981). 
partners to return, since partners were not 
called to corroborate his story, and defendant Use related to purpose of agreement. 
conveniently forgot important details. State v. Subsection (1) assumes that the property 
Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 R2d 780 (1966). n^y be used by the custodian for purposes 
Evidence supported conviction of embezzle- properly related to the purpose of the entrust-
ment, where defendant had been given permis- ment; only a use that constitutes "a gross 
sion to continue to use car on somewhat open- deviation from the agreed purpose," without 
ended contract after initial rental period had
 e x p r e M consent for personal use, is a crime, 
expired, but defendant foiled to return car on
 S t a t e v jfo^ 6 1 0 R2d 1275 (Utah 1980). 
specific date on which he was finally told that 
he must return it. State v. Heemer, 26 Utah 2d Cited in State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah 
309, 489 P.2d 107 (1971). Ct. App. 1988). 
"Gross deviation." 
As used in this section, the term "gross de-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Larceny } 89. Key Numbers. — Larceny «=» 15. 
CJB. — 52A C.J.S. Larceny §§ 46,47. 
76-6-411. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 76-6-411, as enacted by tion of property subject to legal obligation, was 
L. 1973, ch. 196, { 76-6-411, relating to theft by repealed by Laws 1974, ch. 32, § 41. 
failure to make required payment or disposi-
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been uyured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) 
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-
408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
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History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, § 18; 
1975, ch. 48, S 1; 1977, ch. 89, § 1; 1989, ch. 
78, § 1. 
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Construction. 
Determining degree of crime. 
Evidence. 
Instructions. 
Lesser included offenses. 
Livestock. 
Prior convictions. 
Single offense based on separate takings. 
Valuation of stolen property. 
—Testimony of owner. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
This section, by making theft of certain live-
stock a third degree felony, irrespective of the 
value of the livestock, does not deny equal 
protection of the laws and does not violate the 
constitutional prohibition against private or 
special laws. State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 
1981). 
Construction. 
This section does not outline the elements of 
the crime of theft; it simply categorizes theft for 
sentencing purposes into various degrees of 
felonies and misdemeanors. Thus defendant 
was improperly charged under § 76-6-404 and 
this section with two separate counts of second 
degree theft for stealing both a firearm and 
property worth over $1000 in a single burglary; 
the crime was instead one theft offense under 
§ 76-6-404 punishable as a second degree fel-
ony under this section. State v. Casias, 772 P.2d 
975 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
No claim for treble damages based on § 76-
6-408(2Xd) and this section against businesses 
that regularly deal in large bulk orders of raw 
industrial material. See Alta Indus. Ltd. v. 
Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993). 
Determining degree of crime. 
In theft by deception, degree of the crime is 
determined by the value of the property ob-
tained by defendant as a result of the deception 
without reducing that amount by any value 
received by the victim. State v. Forshee, 588 
P.2d 181 (Utah 1978). 
Defendant's second degree felony conviction, 
based on a check written for exactly $1,000, 
was plain error, since he could only have been 
convicted of a third degree felony on the basis of 
the $1,000 check. State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 
(Utah 1985). 
Cross-References. — Bus Passenger Safety 
Act, theft of baggage or cargo, 5 76-10-1508. 
Civil liability for treble damages for theft of 
livestock, § 4-24-27. 
DECISIONS 
Evidence. 
State's use of color photographs of the stolen 
property for evidence rather than producing 
the actual tangible stolen property did not deny 
defendant due process of law. State v. 
Ballenberger, 652 P.2d 927 (Utah 1982). 
Instructions. 
It was reversible error to omit to instruct as 
to amount of debt owing by defendant on auto, 
left for repairs, but taken and driven away 
without satisfying lien existing on car, if jury 
had found that debt was less than $50, convic-
tion for grand larceny would have been error. 
State v. Parker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P.2d 626 
(1943). 
Lesser included offenses. 
The crime of carrying a concealed dangerous 
weapon is a lesser included offense of second-
degree felony retail theft when the retail theft 
is made a felony by the actor's being armed 
with a deadly weapon in the course of the 
crime. State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Livestock. 
Theft of dead calf was grand larceny, even 
though value of meat did not exceed $50, where 
animal was killed by thief as means of making 
theft possible. State v. Laub, 102 Utah 402,131 
P.2d 805 (1942). 
Prior convictions. 
A judgment of prior conviction must be writ-
ten, clear and definite, and signed by the court 
(or the clerk in a jury case) in order to serve as 
the basis for enhancing a penalty under this 
section. State v. Anderson, 797 P. 2d 1114 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Single offense based on separate takings. 
Where defendant was employed to solicit 
advertising contracts and within short time 
had collected from different persons $235 due 
publishing company upon contracts solicited 
and procured by him, and where he had unlaw-
fully converted money to his own use, taking of 
$235 was one embezzlement and constituted 
grand larceny, even though $48 was largest 
amount collected from any one individual. 
State v. Gibson, 37 Utah 330,108 P. 349 (1910). 
The value of the property stolen in separate 
transactions can be added together to deter-
mine the degree of the crime if the separate 
transactions are part of one continuing plan 
and thus constitute a single offense. State v. 
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(iv) is or exceeds $5,000 or if the offender has previously been 
convicted of a violation of this section, the offense is a second degree 
felony, 
(b) In the case of theft of cable television services, the penalties are 
prescribed in Section 76-6-412. 
(5) A person who violates this section shall make restitution to the utility or 
cable television company for the value of the gas, electricity, water, sewer, or 
cable television service consumed in violation of this section plus all reasonable 
expenses and costs incurred on account of the violation of this section. 
Reasonable expenses and costs include expenses and costs for investigation, 
disconnection, reconnection, service calls, employee time, and equipment use. 
(6) Criminal prosecution under this section does not affect the right of a 
utility or cable television company to bring a civil action for redress for 
damages suffered as a result of the commission of any of the acts prohibited by 
this section. 
(7) This section does not abridge or alter any other right, action, or remedy 
otherwise available to a utility or cable television company. 
History: C. 1953,1 76-6-409.3, enacted by prohibited acts* for "any of the following acta" in 
L. 1987, ch. 88, § 3; 1989, eh. 30,1 S; 1990, Subsection (2), rewrote Subsection (4Xa), 
eh. 130,1 1; 1995, ch. 291,1 12. changing the value ranges and the degrees of 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- offenses, and made a minor stylistic change, 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "any 
76-6-409.6. Use of telecommunication device to avoid law-
ful charge for service — Penalty. 
(1) Any person who uses a telecommunication device with the intent to 
avoid the payment of any lawful charge for telecommunication service or with 
the knowledge that it was to avoid the payment of any lawful charge for 
telecommunication service is guilty of: 
(a) a class B misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service 
is less than $300 or cannot be ascertained; 
(b) a class A misdemeanor, if the value of the telecommunication service 
charge is or exceeds $300 but is not more than $1,000; 
(c) a third degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service is 
or exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $5,000; or 
(d) a second degree felony, if the value of the telecommunication service 
is or exceeds $5,000. 
(2) Any person who has been convicted previously of an offense under this 
section shall be guilty of a second degree felony upon a second conviction and 
any subsequent conviction. 
History: C. 1953,76-6-409.6, enacted by L. than $300 or" in Subsection (lXa) and changed 
1994, ch. 215, < 3; 1995, ch. 291, i 13. the value ranges in Subsections (lXb) through 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- (d). 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, inserted "is less 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
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(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another, 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is less 
than $5,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) 
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-
408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
History: C. 1958, 76-6-412, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
1978, ch* 196, t 76-6-412; 1974, ch* 82,1 18; ment, effective May 1, 1995, increaaed the 
1976, ch* 48, t 1; 1977, ch. 89,1 1; 1989, ch* value amount* in Subsections UXaXi), dXbXi), 
78,1 1; 1995, ch- 891,1 14. (1XO, and dXd). 
PARTS 
FRAUD 
76-6-501. Forgery — "Writing" defined. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he: 
(a) alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, transfers, pub-
lishes, or utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion* 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purports to be the act of another, whether the person is existent or 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing* includes: 
(a) printing or any other method of recording information, checks, 
tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money, and any 
other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) printing or writing a security, revenue stamp, or any other instru-
ment or writing issued by a government or any agency; or 
(c) printing or writing a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other 
instrument or writing representing an interest in or claim against 
property, or a pecuniary interest in or claim against any person or 
enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
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(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those eases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3) (b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C 195Sf 76*2*2, enacted by L. 
19S6, en- 47, | 41; 1987, eh. 161,1 80S; 1988, 
ch. S48,1 5; 1989, eh. *7,1 1; 1992, eh-127, 
I 11; 1994, eh, 191, I 2; 1995, eh. 2S7,1 5; 
1995, eh. 199,1 46. 
Amendment Note*. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27,1992, in Subjection (4), 
deleted former Subsections (e) and (f), which 
read: "general water adjudication' and "taxa-
tion and revenue; and," respectively, making 
related changes; redesignated former Subsec-
tion (g) as Subsection (a); and made stylistic 
changes in Subsection (e). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
added Subsections (SXk) and (4Xe), making 
related changes. 
Ihe 1995 amendments by eh. 267 and ch. 
299, both affective May 1,1995, made the same 
changes: they changed 'Board of State Lands 
and Forestry" to 'School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Board of Trustees" in Subsection 
(SXeXiii) and added Subsection (SXeXvi). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Appellate Jurisdiction. 
—Attachment. 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Certiorari. 
Original jurisdiction. 
—Extraordinary write. 
Cited. 
Appellate juriediction. 
—Attachment 
Although this eection did not govern a land 
conveyance because it was not in affect when 
petitioner filed its writ of review, this eection 
did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdic-
tion, because jurisdiction attached under the 
statute in effect when the petition for review 
was filed. Nations] Parks & Conservation ASB'D 
v. Board of Sute Lands, S69 P.2d 909 (Utah 
1993). 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Subdivision (3XeXiii) confers jurisdiction in 
the Supreme Court only over final orders and 
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative 
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of Sute Lands k 
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992). 
Certiorari 
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
granted by this eection, the Supreme Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
Dot of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the 
parties should address the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 R2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
Original jurisdiction-
—Extraordinary write. 
The term "original" in Subsection (2) adds 
nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdic-
tion — and its absence in I 76-2a«3(l) takes 
nothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals — because jurisdiction over petitions 
for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a 
court's jurisdiction to consider a petition origi-
nally filed with it as opposed to its appellate 
jurisdiction over eases thst originated else-
where. Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah 
CtApp.1994). 
Cited in Sute v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1991). 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
7S»2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-S. Court of Appeals jurisdiction* 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
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(a) to cany into affect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal acftudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutions} 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry 
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions d 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in case* 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, is 
eluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, chil( 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appeUatf 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals haJ 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1958, 7*2*4, emoted by L. 
19*6, eh. 47,1 46; 1987, eh. 161,1 804; 1988, 
eh. 7a, I Is m s , eh. tlO, I 141; 1*SS, eh. 
24S, I S; 1990, eh. SO, I a,* 1990, eh. 224,1 8; 
1991, eh. aSS, I 22; 1992, eh. 127,1 12; 1994, 
eh. 18, | 46; 1995, eh. 299,1 47. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subjec-
tion (2Xh) and redesignated former Subsection! 
<2Xh) through (J) si Subjections (2Xi) through 
00. 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole* fa 
'Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2Xb) sal 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act* sj 
Subsection (4). 1 
Ihe 1995 amendment, effective May 1,199u 
substituted "School and Institutional TruiJ 
Lands Board of Trustee!, Division of Severed 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by wk 
executive director of the Department of Natunj 
Resources* for "Board of State Lands* in BcA 
section (2Xs). 
